We are running a race with Time; we outstrip the sun, with the round world for the race-course. 1 The implementation of an imperial telegraph network over the course of the late nineteenth century caused a considerable amount of ink to be spilled, in praise, in fear and in confusion. By 1876, with the completion of the trans-Tasman cable between Australia and New Zealand, the British government could communicate with all of its major colonies by electric telegraph. As long as the lines remained intact (this was by no means a certainty), a message could be conveyed from London to Wellington, New Zealand, via the "thunderbolts of Jove". 2 The rapid contraction of time and space that this entailed was much commented upon by contemporaries, who marvelled at the reduction in communication time between England and her antipodes from 3-4 months to a matter of hours. As the most distant colony in the empire, New
Electromagnetic telegraphy was closely related to more general advances in science and engineering associated with not only DuBois-Reymond and other early scientists like Alessandro Volta (1745-1827), Han Oersted (1777-1851), and George Simon Ohm (1787-1854), but the magical wires that transmitted messages across land and under the oceans had immediate implications for empire builders and strategists alike. 6 Electric telegraphy was viewed by its various inventors and promoters as a 'tool of empire', capable of uniting the empire at the very point at which it appeared to be losing cohesion. In retrospect, it is natural enough to suggest that that the telegraph, along with the steamship and railways, was one of the key catalysts behind the "imperialist euphoria [of] the last third of the nineteenth century". 7 This is the claim of a number of recent (and not so recent) histories of technology in the British Empire, which all position the imperial telegraph network as a key agent of social, economic and cultural change across both individual colonies and the empire as a whole, suggesting that it was one important element in a complex matrix of communication, representation and material progress which acted to not only bind the empire in time, but in purpose and belief. 8 While undoubtedly correct at the macro level (the success of the cable network can be determined quantitatively in terms of commerce and qualitatively at the level of culture and politics) none of these books has within its scope an extended examination of one area of empire, one colony which could be used as a case study to explicate the more complex and contradictory impacts of the telegraph. While all of them demonstrate an awareness of the issues surrounding the history of technology -and in particular the problem of technological determinism and resultant tendencies towards Whiggishness -their macro, imperial viewpoint tends to compromise their best intentions: the telegraph network expands, the steamships and railways are developed, and the empire is enhanced. This essay aims to complement the approach of these studies with a micro-study of the impact of the imperial telegraph's arrival in New Zealand in 1876. As the most distant of all the British colonies (12,000 miles from London and 1200 miles from its nearest neighbour, Australia) New Zealand presents an intriguing study.
A second aim of this paper is to attempt an integration of the history of technology with what Robert Kubicek has recently termed "conventional" 9 studies of empire. Although generally in praise of Marsden and Smith's book, Kubicek quite correctly points out that if the history of technology is going to offer any really tangible new perspectives on imperial history, it needs to engage with the dominant models behind the expansion, development, and ultimate dissolution of that empire.
Given the multiplication of theories about empire, from studies into the 'British world', 10 the evergreen Gallagher and Robinson, 11 their critique by Cain and Hopkins, 12 a number of studies into relationships between centre and periphery 13 (reminiscent of the pioneering work by Edward Shills in America 14 ) , and Bernard
Porter's overt comparisons between Britain's nineteenth century empire and America's (technologically enabled, it should be noted) twenty-first century one, it seems a useful project. 15 Rather than provide another critique of these theories -as has been done elsewhere 16 Communication loomed large in these experiments: both within each colony, across the Tasman, and back to the imperial centre. 39 The Australasian bridgeheadin all its commercial, governmental, religious and military guises -was in communication with the imperial centre on all matters of significance, but those communications took months. 40 The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 reduced this to a matter of weeks but delays were still common and up to date news was impossible to get until the advent of the telegraph. Moreover, even after the Suez route opened, it was not easily navigable for the sailing ships which carried the vast bulk of Australasian cargo until the late 1890s. Steamships were slower to replace sailing ships on the London -Australasian route than elsewhere, simply because the length of the journey necessitated too much coal. It was only with the widespread introduction of the compound or dual expansion steam engine (which used the steam twice over) and the geared steam turbine (later used to turn the ships propellers) that the journey became economic for anything other than high-value cargoes such as mail, which usually necessitated government subsidies. 41 Given that relationships between New Zealand and Britain were particularly strained during the early 1870s
because of the New Zealand Wars, and some New Zealand politicians were occasionally complaining of "unfair and unkind treatment", 42 efficient
communications with the imperial government were a priority.
From the start, communications between the Australasian bridgehead and the imperial centre were dependent upon government sponsorship. Although commercial interests were heavily involved in proposals for the implementation of telegraph lines, those proposals invariably included a degree of either government subsidy or assurance of monopoly control of the industry, or both. 43 The reasons for the initial acquiescence to these demands lay at both ends of the system -at Home in London and on the periphery -although the Australasians appear to have been significantly more motivated to make advances. The imperial authorities, while encouraging developments for strategic reasons, were reticent about getting involved in major communications projects after a string of expensive failures with the London -Dover -Calais Cable, the Red Sea Cable and the Atlantic Cable. 44 Here Darwin's theory of bridgeheads is especially useful: the "diversity of British interests on the periphery" (commercial, governmental, and in Julius Vogel's case, cultural and perhaps even personal) acted to solidify British territorial expansion through (colonial) government subsidised development based on overseas borrowing. 45 Although gentlemanly capitalists provided some finance, and a great deal of hectoring in the case of the telegraph, the colonial governments carried the financial and commercial risk for developments in communications technologies such as railways and the telegraph: 46 this was free trade on crutches.
As Darwin suggests, however, the Australasian bridgehead functioned as a "hinge or interface between the metropole and a local periphery". 47 Colonial advances in communications infrastructures were undoubtedly met with pleasure at the centre, where issues of imperial defence were beginning to assume more importance. As the dominant global power, the British Empire had significant strategic issues to deal with, especially in terms of a series of colonial wars and continued tension on the Continent, so that its army and navy were stretched to their limits for much of the late nineteenth century. The Indian Uprising of 1857 was only one manifestation of strategic problems related to the ratio of indigenous to British troops, supply, and mobilisation. 49 Once the problems associated with submarine cables were surmounted in the 1860s, 50 there was thus a great rush to complete an "All Red Route" 51 around the world, which would touch only on British controlled territory (if at all; the aim was to create an exclusively undersea route) and allow prompt communication with all areas of the empire.
The key to the successful development of an All Red Route was quite simple:
each colony (or to use Darwin's category, 'bridgehead') needed to develop an internal network of telegraph lines, which would then be strung together through submarine cables. 52 Economic needs within each colony would determine the rate at which internal telegraph networks were developed, but it was clear by the 1850s that hours, and was immediately put on steamers for the trip across the Tasman to Bluff, where it was relayed across New Zealand's own telegraph system through an increasingly sophisticated press system. 56 In 1874 an alteration to New Zealand's Electric Telegraph Act, 1865, allowed for all telegrams originating in the colonies of New South Wales, Tasmania and Queensland (Victoria had been included years before) to be transmitted across the Tasman by post for no additional charge.
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Although the commercial impulse, in tandem with imperial and colonial assurances, got the lines as far as Australia, it took several years to make it the final 1200 miles across the Tasman.
The reasons for this delay were several: submarine cables were no longer viewed as lucrative commercial enterprises, and it was felt (correctly as it turned out) that the trans-Tasman cable would simply not be economic and that the colony had too many other pressing technological concerns. Experience had also shown that up to 50% or more of telegraphic traffic worldwide was government or commercerelated and the general public tended to avoid the services due to prohibitive costs.
Cable laying firms such as Siemens and Eastern Telegraph regularly asked for terms that were unacceptable to the colonial government, such as line monopolies of up to 50 years 58 and ₤30,000 subsidies to ensure profitability. In addition to this, New
Zealand was closely involved in negotiations to establish a mail service via San Francisco, 59 which would provide faster service than via Australia and Suez and would itself be costly. Finally, New Zealand's experience of maintaining a telegraph network indicated it was a problematic and costly business.
The first local telegraph line was developed in Christchurch in 1862, to run alongside the newly laid Christchurch -Lyttelton railway. Samuel Butler was so taken with the contrast between the rugged Canterbury Plains and the new technologies that he began writing philosophical tracts to the Christchurch Press 60 about machine theory, and later extended this into his chapter in Erewhon which explained why machines were banned from this dystopian land. 61 The following year Julius Vogel began to back the extension of the telegraph system, however, claiming that the extension of the system had the ability to "effect a universal revolution . . ." and unite the disparate provinces into one national body. 63 64 The extension of pastoralism in the South Island was undoubtedly fuelling this expenditure by the provincial governments, but it should be viewed as a localised and economically determined phenomenon. In the absence of railways, and with a small and highly dispersed population, the telegraph was believed to be a relatively cheap and effective means of communication -especially between the various port towns and their hinterlands. Local communities thus placed ever-increasing amounts of pressure on their ministerial representatives to release funding. 65 Telegraphic communication (even in the absence of a trans-Tasman cable) meant faster access to prices on the Australian and London markets and could be the difference between success and failure for small farming communities. Despite concerns within central government that telegraphs were "a thing to be avoided in the present financial state of the colony", 66 and that "the expense would be enormously greater than in England where the poles were placed along the railroad" 67 rather than through difficult terrain, there appears to have been considerable interest within provincial governments.
Eric Pawson and Neil C. Quigley have gone further than this, and suggested
that New Zealand's telegraph system greatly enhanced communication between the provinces and was implicated in the centralisation of government authority, as Vogel had envisaged. 68 Certainly, when the New Zealand government shifted their proceedings from Auckland to Wellington in 1865, the telegraph system was immediately enhanced. Although the telegraph office remained in Christchurch, the government made it clear to the chief engineer, Alfred Sheath, that it was "anxious" 69 to proceed with a Cook Strait cable and ordered soundings for this purpose.
Unfortunately for Sheath his subsequent survey was faulty, the landing point for the cable was ill-chosen, and New Zealanders had to put up "with repeated and often lengthy periods when, for one reason or another, it failed to work". 70 Nevertheless, the relocation of the New Zealand government clearly impacted upon the development of the colony's telegraph network to a far greater degree than either private enterprise or imperial strategy. 71 The Cook Strait cable was finally landed Despite these problems the telegraph system became more than a merely utilitarian tool. It became a symbol of the colony's maturation and development and a marker of New Zealanders' desire for technological development independent of the other Australasian colonies: technological advance was quickly connected to cultural advance. In large part any feelings of pride were articulated within a broader discourse of imperial loyalty, but in fundamental terms this period in New Zealand history witnessed the first growth of a colonial identity distinct from, and sometimes even in opposition to, both imperial and Australasian identity. 80 Ironically, then, the growth of colonial nationalism went hand in hand with the extension of the electric telegraph system: the settlers sought autochthony wherever they could in order to build a bulwark against the feelings of isolation they felt (exacerbated by the wars).
That could be found in either archaism or the futurism implicit in technological advance. By the time Julius Vogel was appointed as Telegraph Commissioner in 1869 it was abundantly clear that the network was viewed as something of considerable importance to the colony as a whole. He refused a request in the House for telegraph offices to be closed on Sundays, 81 on the grounds that "the disturbed state of the country" 82 required important telegrams to be despatched without a moment's delay.
In 1870 Vogel began to move drafts of the Immigration and Public Works
Act, and involve himself with the issue of "telegraphic communication with
Europe". 83 As Commissioner for Telegraphs he felt that the colonies should act jointly and not allow any future imperial or world network to fall into commercial hands, voicing a clear preference for an imperial network that would be quite distinct from any wider world network that might compromise imperial security in times of war as well as peace. 84 Vogel was eventually charged with the important task, in this context at least, of securing a reasonable contract for the laying of the trans-Tasman In these outlying unpeopled regions of the globe the British race increases with a rapidity beyond the reach of the Continental nations; and every year is bringing closer the scattered sections of our numerous and powerful race, annihilating distances by the ever-increasing triumphs of the railway, telegraph and steam navigation. New Zealand, Australia, the Cape -in fact all our colonies, by the force of blood and the necessity of position, will ere long become important maritime Powers. Seddon's promise of troops for the South African War before war had even been declared), but the development of the press system was probably the most significant feature. 111 As Simon Potter points out, New Zealand and Australia were tied into an imperial system of news distribution almost solely because the ownership of the lines. 112 The "Eastern and Eastern Extension Telegraph Company enjoyed a monopoly over Australian traffic", 113 and New Zealand remained almost totally dependent upon an Australasian model of news distribution for the rest of the nineteenth century. 114 In this sense, the Australasian bridgehead was perpetuated by the imperial cable network not only at a commercial, but a cultural level.
The extension of the imperial cable network to nineteenth century New Zealand was by no means a great triumph of engineering, therefore, but it was nevertheless a triumph for the empire. The fact that the system was extended across the Tasman from Australia despite a lack of commercial merit, a lack of public interest, and for many years outright hostility from both the imperial and colonial governments, speaks volumes to the merely discursive, or perhaps imaginative, power exerted by the idea of empire -and the interpenetration of this conceit with both technological modernity and utopianism. The project is reflective of Miles Taylor's identification of an "imperialist euphoria" 115 which took hold during the last third of the nineteenth century, and interestingly suggests that this euphoria may have been enough in itself (especially when attached to the mind of a man like Julius Vogel) to force progress against commercial logic. Once established in New Zealand, for reasons nationalist as well as imperial, the telegraph system came to symbolise the ultimate connection between the past and present, in a mode of colonial nationalism which claimed autochthony through both archaism and technological modernity.
Notes

